Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions

27 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2009

See all articles by Eric Magar

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Date Written: February 7, 2007

Abstract

The paper modi es Romer and Rosenthal's Agenda Setter Model to treat vetoes as deliberate position-taking exercises by elected offceholders, applying it to inter-branch negotiation in presidential systems. The model changes players' motivation, giving them preferences over the signals conveyed by their actions, in addition to standard preferences over policy (as Groseclose and McCarty 2001), while leaving information complete (unlike Cameron 2000). The model explains both veto and veto-override incidence, like Cameron, unlike Groseclose and McCarty. Analysis distinguishes executive stunts (vetoes triggering overrides) from assembly stunts (these do not). Ten hypotheses are derived, including some conforming with Cameron (more vetoes with divided government) and some not (more with proximal elections and with large parties able to override vetoes). Hypotheses do not necessitate ideal-point estimatesto so can be tested across a wide array of national and sub-national presidential systems.

Keywords: veto power, position taking, elections, president, assembly

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Magar, Eric, Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions (February 7, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1486804 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486804

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
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525554904674 (Fax)

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