Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1487307
 
 

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Citations (11)



 


 



Matching with Trade-Offs: Revealed Preferences Over Competing Characteristics


Alfred Galichon


NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute

Bernard Salanie


Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

March 22, 2009


Abstract:     
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe.

The social optimum must therefore trade off matching on incomes and matching on educations. Given a flexible specification of the surplus function, we characterize under mild assumptions the properties of the set of feasible matchings and of the socially optimal matching. Then we show how data on the covariation of the types of the partners in observed matches can be used to estimate the parameters that define social preferences over matches. We provide both nonparametric and parametric procedures that are very easy to use in applications.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: Matching, Marriage, Assignment

JEL Classification: C78, D61, C13


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Date posted: October 14, 2009 ; Last revised: March 24, 2010

Suggested Citation

Galichon, Alfred and Salanie, Bernard, Matching with Trade-Offs: Revealed Preferences Over Competing Characteristics (March 22, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1487307 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1487307

Contact Information

Alfred Galichon (Contact Author)
NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute ( email )
269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
Bernard Salanie
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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