Resale Price Maintenance

OECD Best Practice Roundtables in Competition Policy Working Paper No. 94

307 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2009 Last revised: 18 Oct 2009

Jeremy K. West

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation; OECD Competition Division

Date Written: October 12, 2009

Abstract

This document (of 307 pages) comprises the proceedings of a roundtable meeting on Refusals to Deal held by the OECD's Competition Committee in October 2007. It consists of an executive summary, a background paper by Jeremy West of the OECD Secretariat, 21 delegation submissions and a summary of the oral discussion.

The term “resale price maintenance” refers to a practice in which suppliers and resellers come to an understanding that places restrictions on the prices that resellers may charge. While there are a number of different types of such agreements, the most common one involves a supplier agreeing with retailers that they will not charge less than a certain price for the supplier’s product. RPM may harm consumers by restricting intrabrand price competition, but RPM may also benefit consumers by promoting interbrand competition. Despite these mixed effects, most OECD countries treat RPM as a per se violation of their competition laws. The materials in this document cover the positive and negative effects of RPM, as well as the reasons for and against treating it as a per se offence instead of applying the rule of reason.

Keywords: resale price maintenance, RPM, vertical restraints

JEL Classification: K21, L11, L42

Suggested Citation

West, Jeremy K., Resale Price Maintenance (October 12, 2009). OECD Best Practice Roundtables in Competition Policy Working Paper No. 94. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1487619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1487619

Jeremy K. West (Contact Author)

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

OECD Competition Division ( email )

2, rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, F-75775
France

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