Non-Partisan 'Get-Out-The-Vote' Efforts and Policy Outcomes

32 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2009

See all articles by Dan Kovenock

Dan Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2009

Abstract

This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment’s size.

Keywords: get out the vote, redistributive politics, nonprofit advocacy organizations, Colonel Blotto Game, Tullock Game

JEL Classification: D72, C72, L30

Suggested Citation

Kovenock, Daniel and Roberson, Brian, Non-Partisan 'Get-Out-The-Vote' Efforts and Policy Outcomes (October 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2815, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1488007 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1488007

Daniel Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Brian Roberson (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

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