Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man?

Games and Economic Behavior 77(1), January 2013, 181-213.

58 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2010 Last revised: 23 Dec 2012

See all articles by Yan Chen

Yan Chen

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics

Peter Katuscak

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)

Emre Ozdenoren

London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 22, 2012

Abstract

We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle.

Keywords: gender, menstrual cycle, contraceptive pills, auction, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, D44, D83

Suggested Citation

Chen, Yan and Katuscak, Peter and Ozdenoren, Emre, Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man? (December 22, 2012). Games and Economic Behavior 77(1), January 2013, 181-213., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1489976 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1489976

Yan Chen (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )

611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States

Peter Katuscak

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) ( email )

Aachen, 52056
Germany

Emre Ozdenoren

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
81
Abstract Views
900
rank
340,224
PlumX Metrics