Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort

American Law and Economics Review, 2010

U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-027

25 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2009  

Luciana Echazu

Clarkson University

Nuno M. Garoupa

Texas A&M University School of Law; Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

We consider the distortions that corruption generates in law enforcement. Corruption dilutes deterrence, and hence the government needs to adjust law enforcement activities appropriately. We argue that this distortion is not the only one taking place. A misalignment of goals between the government and the enforcers results in another set of agency costs by which activities that put enforcers in direct contact with criminals increase at the cost of other law enforcement activities. The paper discusses the implications of both distortions.

Keywords: corruption, fine, enforcer

JEL Classification: K4

Suggested Citation

Echazu, Luciana and Garoupa, Nuno M., Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort (October 1, 2009). American Law and Economics Review, 2010; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-027. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1491212

Luciana Echazu

Clarkson University ( email )

Potsdam, NY 13699-5780
United States
315-268-6456 (Phone)

Nuno M. Garoupa (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University School of Law ( email )

1515 Commerce St.
Fort Worth, TX 76102
United States

Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law ( email )

Lisboa
Portugal

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