The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime

Political Research Quarterly, 2010

36 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2009

See all articles by Eric D. Raile

Eric D. Raile

North Dakota State University

Carlos Pereira

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)

Timothy J. Power

University of Oxford

Date Written: October 21, 2009

Abstract

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations while also considering dynamism and particular bargaining contexts. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – function as substitutes. Coalition goods establish an exchange baseline, while pork covers the ongoing costs of operation. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.

Keywords: Coalitions, Multiparty Presidential Regime, Cabinet Position, Pork Barrel

Suggested Citation

Raile, Eric D. and Pereira, Carlos and Power, Timothy J., The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime (October 21, 2009). Political Research Quarterly, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1492209

Eric D. Raile

North Dakota State University ( email )

Fargo, ND 58105
United States

Carlos Pereira (Contact Author)

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) ( email )

R. Dr. Neto de Araujo 320 cj 1307
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro 22250-900
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://ebape.fgv.br/en/faculty-members/carlos-pereira

Timothy J. Power

University of Oxford ( email )

Department of Economics
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3UQ
United Kingdom

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