Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Public vs Private Ownership, Board Structure and Fund Manager Turnover

Financial Management Volume 42, Issue 1, pages 127–154, Spring 2013

39 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2009 Last revised: 21 Oct 2014

John C. Adams

University of Texas at Arlington

Sattar Mansi

Virginia Tech

Takeshi Nishikawa

University of Colorado at Denver

Date Written: April 13, 2011

Abstract

We examine the relation between organizational structure (public vs private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of U.S. offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded firms focus more on shorter term performance, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive to prior fund performance when making replacement decisions and experience smaller post turnover performance improvements. Additional testing suggests a higher likelihood of fund manager replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards more independent. Overall, our results indicate that organizational form plays a pivotal role in the managerial labor market for mutual funds.

Keywords: Mutual funds, board structure, organizational structure, managerial turnover

JEL Classification: G20, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Adams, John C. and Mansi, Sattar and Nishikawa, Takeshi, Public vs Private Ownership, Board Structure and Fund Manager Turnover (April 13, 2011). Financial Management Volume 42, Issue 1, pages 127–154, Spring 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1492846 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1492846

John C. Adams

University of Texas at Arlington ( email )

Box 19449 UTA
Arlington, TX 76019
United States
904-476-2946 (Phone)

Takeshi Nishikawa

University of Colorado at Denver ( email )

Box 173364
1250 14th Street
Denver, CO 80217
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
240
Rank
106,438
Abstract Views
1,064