Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision Making

38 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2009

See all articles by David M. Byrne

David M. Byrne

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Bridget Hiedemann

Seattle University

Michelle Sovinsky Goeree

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Steven N. Stern

Stony Brooke University

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Abstract

We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of adult children's opportunity costs, quality of care, and caregiving burden on their propensities to provide informal care. We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest.

Suggested Citation

Byrne, David M. and Hiedemann, Bridget and Goeree, Michelle Sovinsky and Stern, Steven N., Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision Making. International Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 1205-1242, November 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1495274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00566.x

David M. Byrne

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th and C Streets, NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Bridget Hiedemann

Seattle University ( email )

900 Broadway
Seattle, WA 98122
United States

Michelle Sovinsky Goeree

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~goeree/

Steven N. Stern

Stony Brooke University

Melville Library N4004
Stony Brook, NY 11794-3384
United States

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