Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision Making
38 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2009
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Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision-Making
Abstract
We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of adult children's opportunity costs, quality of care, and caregiving burden on their propensities to provide informal care. We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest.
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Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision Making
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