On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs

Abstract

Considering that roughly 75 percent of new businesses fail within the first five years, it is difficult to account for entrepreneurs' irrationally overconfident behavior.One explanation is that overconfident entrepreneurs are less likely to imitate their peers and more likely to explore their environment.When groups compete and inferior groups disappear, groups with some entrepreneurial activity may gain enough of an evolutionary advantage to permit entrepreneurs to survive in equilibrium; in other words, groups with some overconfident individuals have an evolutionary advantage over groups without such individuals. A model illustrates the idea that overconfidence imposes only small costs on entrepreneurs (who put too much weight on their own information) but provides large benefits in revealing their private information to their groups.The presentation of the model is followed by a discussion of factors influencing the trade-off between the positive information externality and the high rate of entrepreneurial attrition.This trade-off results in an optimal proportion of entrepreneurs and depends on the size of the group, the degree of overconfidence, and the accuracy of individuals' private information. What follows is a discussion of the trade-off between intergroup and intragroup selection, as well as arguments pro and con group selection.One alternative explanation for overconfidence exists: when trying to deceive others that they are of higher ability, individuals' credibility is enhanced if they are themselves convinced of this ability.(SAA)

Keywords: Theoretical, Overconfidence, Self-efficacy, Management decisions, Startups, Groups, Risk orientation, Survival rates