Convex Games Versus Clan Games

Posted: 22 Apr 2010

See all articles by Rodica Branzei

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Dinko Dimitrov

Bielefeld University - Institute of Mathematical Economics

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

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Date Written: December 1, 2008

Abstract

In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.

Keywords: Convex Games, Core, Dual Games, Marginal Games, Total Clan Games, Weber Set

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Branzei, Rodica and Dimitrov, Dinko and Tijs, Stef H., Convex Games Versus Clan Games (December 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1496155

Rodica Branzei (Contact Author)

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Iasi
Romania

Dinko Dimitrov

Bielefeld University - Institute of Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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