Not Available for Download

Cartelizing Groups in Dynamic Linear Oligopoly with Antitrust Threshold

International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 399-419, 2008

Posted: 31 Oct 2009  

Akio Matsumoto

Chuo University

Ugo Merlone

University of Turin - Department of Psychology

Ferenc Szidarovszky

University of Arizona - Department of Systems & Industrial Engineering (SIE)

Date Written: December 2008

Abstract

The effects of partially cooperating firms are examined in N-firm oligopolies. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is assumed to detect the violation of the antitrust regulation by the firms, and based on this assumption a piece-wise differentiable dynamic system can be developed. The firms stop cooperating if this index becomes larger than a certain threshold and they restart or continue cooperating otherwise. The equilibria of the dynamic system are first determined. Local and global asymptotic stability of the equilibria are then investigated showing the complexity of the dynamic behavior of the system.

Keywords: Oligopolies, partial cooperation, shareholding interlocks, antitrust regulation

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Matsumoto, Akio and Merlone, Ugo and Szidarovszky, Ferenc, Cartelizing Groups in Dynamic Linear Oligopoly with Antitrust Threshold (December 2008). International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 399-419, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1496157

Akio Matsumoto (Contact Author)

Chuo University ( email )

2nd floor Blg 4 Tampa Campus
742-1 Higashinakano, Hachioji
Tokyo 192-03
Japan

Ugo Merlone

University of Turin - Department of Psychology ( email )

Via Verdi 10
Torino, I 10124
Italy

Ferenc Szidarovszky

University of Arizona - Department of Systems & Industrial Engineering (SIE) ( email )

Tucson, AZ
United States
520-621-6557 (Phone)

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
456