Measuring Attention and Strategic Behavior in Games with Private Information

50 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2009

See all articles by Isabelle Brocas

Isabelle Brocas

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Juan D. Carrillo

University of Southern California - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stephanie W. Wang

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Colin Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 27, 2009

Abstract

In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the information of others from their choices. We report experimental results in games of private information with three information states, which vary in strategic complexity. “Mousetracking” is used to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, to learn more about the thinking process. Subjects often deviate from Nash equilibrium choices, converge only modestly toward equilibrium across 40 trials, and often fail to look at payoffs which they need to in order to compute an equilibrium response. Theories such as QRE and cursed equilibrium, which can explain nonequilibrium choices, are not well supported by the combination of both choices and lookups. When cluster analysis is used to group subjects according to lookup patterns and choices, the clusters appear to correspond approximately to level-3, level-2 and level-1 thinking in level-k cognitive hierarchy models. The connection between looking and choices is strong enough that the time durations of looking at key payoffs can predict choices, to some extent, at the individual level and at the trial-by-trial level.

Suggested Citation

Brocas, Isabelle and Carrillo, Juan D. and Wang, Stephanie W. and Camerer, Colin F., Measuring Attention and Strategic Behavior in Games with Private Information (October 27, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1496997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1496997

Isabelle Brocas

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3022 S. Vermont Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-8842 (Phone)
213-740-8543 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~brocas/

Juan D. Carrillo

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3022 S. Vermont Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-3526 (Phone)
213-740-8543 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Stephanie W. Wang (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Colin F. Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4054 (Phone)
626-432-1726 (Fax)

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