Institutional Structure of Health Care in Rural Cameroun: Structural Estimation of Production in Teams with Unobservable Effort

Columbia University, Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 9798-16

42 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 1999

Date Written: July 1998

Abstract

Traditional healers in Cameroun are paid on an outcome--contingent basis, where payments are linked to the recovery of the patient. On the other hand, organizational providers (government clinics and hospitals and church--based clinics and hospitals) are paid a fixed fee at the time of consultation. Is this 'custom' of payment method at the traditional healer a response to a problem of imperfect information in the supply of medical care? We fit a contractual model of health care demand to data on observed patterns of provider and contract choice using a Conditional Logit. Patients create an approximate market for medical effort by choosing between discrete contract types. Institutions and organizations play an essential role in the creation of credible quality. Governments can greatly reduce transaction costs (and increase net utility) by specifically recognizing their role as organizations within the context of the institution of modern health care.

JEL Classification: D8, I1, O2

Suggested Citation

Leonard, Kenneth L., Institutional Structure of Health Care in Rural Cameroun: Structural Estimation of Production in Teams with Unobservable Effort (July 1998). Columbia University, Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 9798-16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=149777 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.149777

Kenneth L. Leonard (Contact Author)

University of Maryland ( email )

Symmons Hall, Rm 2200
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742-5535
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.arec.umd.edu/kleonard/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
144
Abstract Views
2,233
Rank
403,560
PlumX Metrics