Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Duress in Contracts: An Economic Analysis

CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Second Edition Vol 6, pp. 57–79, Gerrit de Geest ed., Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 2011

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-041

20 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2009 Last revised: 24 Aug 2011

Péter Cserne

University of Hull; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: November 2, 2009

Abstract

This paper is forthcoming as a chapter in Contract Law and Economics, ed. Gerrit de Geest (Cheltenham: Elgar 2009) [Elgar Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 2nd ed.] and its goal is to provide an overview of the economic analyses of contractual duress. The focus is on distinctive features of the economic perspective on the duress doctrine, as developed in the theoretical literature of law and economics. Before discussing the results of economic analysis, the legal background and some non-economic theories of duress are briefly presented.

Keywords: contact formation, holdup, duress, coercion, necessity, economic duress

JEL Classification: K00, K12

Suggested Citation

Cserne, Péter, Duress in Contracts: An Economic Analysis (November 2, 2009). CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Second Edition Vol 6, pp. 57–79, Gerrit de Geest ed., Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 2011; TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-041. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1498236

Péter Cserne (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University of Hull ( email )

University of Hull School of Law and Politics
Cottingham Road
Hull, HU6 7RX
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.hull.ac.uk/petercserne

Paper statistics

Downloads
458
Rank
51,297
Abstract Views
1,982