How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

WZB Working Paper No. SP II 2009-13

15 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2009

See all articles by Pedro Barros

Pedro Barros

New University of Lisbon

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB); German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Date Written: November 3, 2009

Abstract

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy

JEL Classification: L40, L49, K21

Suggested Citation

Barros, Pedro and Clougherty, Joseph A. and Seldeslachts, Jo, How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (November 3, 2009). WZB Working Paper No. SP II 2009-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1499074

Pedro Barros

New University of Lisbon ( email )

1099-085 Lisboa, 1099-085
Portugal

Joseph A. Clougherty (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 S. Sixth Street
330 Wohlers Hall, MC-706
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
39
Abstract Views
930
PlumX Metrics