Disentangling Psychological Sources of Overpricing in Anticommons Dilemmas: Strategic Incentives, Endowment Effects, and Interdependence of Outcomes

Posted: 7 Nov 2009 Last revised: 6 Aug 2014

See all articles by Andreas Glöckner

Andreas Glöckner

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne

Stephan Tontrup

New York University School of Law

Stefan Bechtold

ETH Zurich

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

Anticommons are a special kind of mixed-motive dilemma in which negative effects for society are caused by the excessive use of exclusion rights. In two fully incentivized experiments on trading goods with risky prospects, we disentangle three psychological sources that have been suggested to contribute to increased pricing in anticommons dilemmas: the effects of strategic incentives for overpricing, endowment effects, and interdependence of outcomes. Our results show that pricing of risky prospects in the anticommons is only marginally influenced by endowment status, while participants readily respond to incentives to overprice and to the interdependence of outcomes. Endowment effects are reduced both when strategic incentives to overprice are provided and when outcomes of subjects become interdependent. As a result, endowment effects for risky prospects are strongly reduced or even disappear completely in anticommons dilemmas. Our results render support for an interaction model instead of an additive effect model in which both incentives and endowment effects would drive up pricing.

Keywords: Anticommons, Social Dilemmas, Endowment Effect, Strategic Incentives

Suggested Citation

Glöckner, Andreas and Tontrup, Stephan and Bechtold, Stefan, Disentangling Psychological Sources of Overpricing in Anticommons Dilemmas: Strategic Incentives, Endowment Effects, and Interdependence of Outcomes (October 1, 2009). This article is accepted for publication in the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Copyright (C) 2014 Wiley. (an early draft of the paper including a part of the data was published as: MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2009/35) . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1500309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1500309

Andreas Glöckner (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/andreas_gloeckner

University of Cologne ( email )

Richard-Strauss-Str. 2
Köln, 50931
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://soccco.uni-koeln.de/andreas-gloeckner.html

Stephan Tontrup

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
+1. 917 535 1165 (Phone)

Stefan Bechtold

ETH Zurich ( email )

IFW E 47.2
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41-44-632-2670 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.ethz.ch/people/bechtold

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,223
PlumX Metrics