Entrepreneurial Alliances as Contractual Forms

Posted: 9 Nov 2009

See all articles by Jeffrey J. Reuer

Jeffrey J. Reuer

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Africa Arino

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Thomas Mellewigt

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Presents an empirical analysis of the contractualdesign of entrepreneurial alliances or collaborative agreements entered into byentrepreneurial firms. First, a series of arguments based on transaction costtheory is used to generate a number of hypotheses regarding the determinants ofthe contractual complexity of collaborative agreements. Taken together, these hypotheses predict that the contractual complexity ofan entrepreneurial alliance will be negatively related to relational capitaland positively related to asset specificity, the costs of searching for apartner, and the strategic importance of the alliance. Data from a survey of 66entrepreneurial firms in the German telecommunications industry are used totest the hypotheses. Analysis of the data reveals that entrepreneurial firms tend to design morecomplex contracts when the costs of searching for a partner are higher and thestrategic importance of the alliance greater. In other words, only two of thehypotheses are viable. These results underscore the fact that governancestructures and contractual forms have different antecedents for entrepreneurialfirms. (SAA)

Keywords: Transaction costs, Telecommunications industry, Contracts & agreements, Interfirm alliances, Cooperation, Assets, Strategic alliances

Suggested Citation

Reuer, Jeffrey J. and Arino, Africa and Mellewigt, Thomas, Entrepreneurial Alliances as Contractual Forms (2006). Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 21, Issue 3, p. 306-325 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1502483

Jeffrey J. Reuer (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Africa Arino

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Thomas Mellewigt

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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