Empirical Test of a Separating Equilibrium in National Football League Contract Negotiations
Posted: 5 Mar 1999
I empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining contract of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. These predictions are tested using data on 1,873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 NFL drafts. The empirical results support the implications of the separating equilibrium.
JEL Classification: C78, J44, J52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Conlin, Michael, Empirical Test of a Separating Equilibrium in National Football League Contract Negotiations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=150263
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