Empirical Test of a Separating Equilibrium in National Football League Contract Negotiations

Posted: 5 Mar 1999

See all articles by Michael Conlin

Michael Conlin

Syracuse University - Department of Economics

Abstract

I empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining contract of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. These predictions are tested using data on 1,873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 NFL drafts. The empirical results support the implications of the separating equilibrium.

JEL Classification: C78, J44, J52

Suggested Citation

Conlin, Michael, Empirical Test of a Separating Equilibrium in National Football League Contract Negotiations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=150263

Michael Conlin (Contact Author)

Syracuse University - Department of Economics ( email )

110 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244-1020
United States
315 443 1354 (Phone)
315 443 3717 (Fax)

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