Creditor Control of Free Cash Flow

35 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2009 Last revised: 4 Nov 2010

Rocco Huang

Michigan State University - Department of Finance; Wharton Financial Institutions Center

Date Written: November 19, 2009

Abstract

With positive free cash flows, firms can choose between accumulating cash, paying out to shareholders, and reducing debts. However, sometimes creditors include an “excess cash flow sweep” covenant in loan contracts, requiring reduction of debt balances ahead of schedule when free cash flows are positive, i.e., when distress risks are actually lower. About 17% of publicly-traded borrowers in our sample (1995-2006) have this covenant attached to at least one of their syndicated loans. We find that the sweep covenant is more frequently seen among more highly leveraged borrowers. The results are robust to including borrower fixed effects (for those taking out multiple loans) or using industry median leverage as a proxy. We also find that the covenant is more common among borrowers that appear more strongly influenced by shareholders, i.e., when more shares are controlled by institutional blockholders, or when firms are incorporated in states with laws more favorable to hostile takeovers. The positive relation between high leverage and the covenant is stronger when blockholders control more shares. These determinants suggest that the sweep covenant may be a contract for mitigating creditor-shareholder conflicts of interests as in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Finally, we show that the covenant has real effects: borrowers affected by the sweep covenant indeed repay more debts when cash flows are higher.

Keywords: free cash flow, creditor rights, agency problems, bank loans, credit agreements, capital structure, cash holdings, covenants, excess cash flow sweep

JEL Classification: G34, G33, G32, K22

Suggested Citation

Huang, Rocco, Creditor Control of Free Cash Flow (November 19, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1502957 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1502957

Rocco Huang (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Finance ( email )

315 Eppley Center
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.roccohuang.com

Wharton Financial Institutions Center

2306 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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