An Economic Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Subsidy

33 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2009

See all articles by Michael G. Faure

Michael G. Faure

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Karine Fiore

Centre d'Analyse Economique; REACH-CLP Unit/Regulated Products Department

Date Written: October 10, 2009

Abstract

This paper deals with liability for nuclear accidents and analyses the international liability regime from an economic perspective. It is argued that the international legal regime provides an implicit subsidy to the nuclear operator by putting a financial cap on liability. It is equally argued that the same effect does not occur under the Price-Anderson Act. The nuclear subsidy awarded under the international regime is calculated and the economic consequences of the liability subsidy are discussed. It is argued that the subsidy leads to an artificial competitiveness of nuclear energy and potentially to a lack of compensation.

Keywords: nuclear liability, nuclear energy, Price Anderson Act, Euratom channelling, limitation on liability

JEL Classification: K13, K32

Suggested Citation

Faure, Michael G. and Fiore, Karine, An Economic Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Subsidy (October 10, 2009). Pace Environmental Law (PELR) Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1503327

Michael G. Faure (Contact Author)

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro ( email )

PO Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 - 43 - 388 30 60 (Phone)
+31 - 43 - 325 90 91 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.michaelfaure.be

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Karine Fiore

Centre d'Analyse Economique ( email )

253 ave du général Leclerc
Maisons-Alfort, cedex 94701
France

REACH-CLP Unit/Regulated Products Department ( email )

253 avenue du general Leclerc
Maisons-Alfort, cedec 94701
France

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
221
rank
130,177
Abstract Views
1,071
PlumX Metrics