49 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2009 Last revised: 4 Dec 2009
Existing formal models of the relationship between trade policy and regulatory policy suggest the potential for a regulatory race to the bottom. WTO rules and disputes, however, center on complaints about excessively stringent regulations. This paper bridges the gap between the existing formal literature and the actual pattern of rules and disputes. Employing the terms-of-trade framework for the modeling of trade agreements, we show how large "nations" may have an incentive to impose discriminatory product standards against imported goods once border instruments are constrained, and how inefficiently stringent standards may emerge under certain circumstances even if regulatory discrimination is prohibited. We then assess the WTO legal framework in light of our results, arguing that it does a reasonably thorough job of policing regulatory discrimination, but that it does relatively little to address excessive nondiscriminatory regulations.
Keywords: international trade, regulation, national treatment, technical barriers to trade
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Staiger, Robert W. and Sykes, Alan O., International Trade and Domestic Regulation. Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 387; Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 1504913. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1504913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1504913
By Henrik Horn
By Kyle Bagwell