A Model of Expertise

31 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 1999

See all articles by Vijay Krishna

Vijay Krishna

Penn State University

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 4, 1999

Abstract

We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker. We ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker consult a cabinet of (two) experts. We first show that there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs. When both experts are biased in the same direction, it is never beneficial to consult both. In contrast, when experts are biased in opposite directions, it is always beneficial to consult both. Finally, a cabinet of extremists is of no value.

JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Krishna, Vijay and Morgan, John, A Model of Expertise (January 4, 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=150589 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.150589

Vijay Krishna (Contact Author)

Penn State University ( email )

Kern 516
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States
814-863-8543 (Phone)
814-863-4775 (Fax)

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-2669 (Phone)
810-885-5959 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/

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