Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study

Posted: 20 Apr 1999

See all articles by John Duffy

John Duffy

University of California, Irvine

Nick Feltovich

University of Houston - Department of Economics

Abstract

This paper presents experimental results from an analysis of two similar games, the repeated ultimatum game and the repeated best-shot game. The experiment examines whether the amount and content of information given to players affects the evolution of play in the two games. In one experimental treatment, subjects in both games observe not only their own actions and payoffs, but also those of one randomly chosen pair of players in the just-completed round of play. In the other treatment, subjects in both games observe only their own actions and payoffs. We present evidence suggesting that observation of other players' actions and payoffs may affect the evolution of play relative to the case of no observation.

JEL Classification: C70, C90

Suggested Citation

Duffy, John and Feltovich, Nicholas J., Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=150707

John Duffy (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Department of Economics
3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697
United States
949-824-8341 (Phone)

Nicholas J. Feltovich

University of Houston - Department of Economics ( email )

Houston, TX 77204-5882
United States

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