Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia

36 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2009

See all articles by Florin Bilbiie

Florin Bilbiie

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Date Written: October 2009

Abstract

This paper shows that absent a commitment technology, central banks can nevertheless achieve the (timeless-)optimal commitment equilibrium if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one. In a prototypical forward-looking New Keynesian model, I develop a general linear-quadratic method to solve for the optimal delegation parameters that generate the optimal amount of inertia in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. I study the optimal design of some policy regimes that are nested within this framework: inflation, output-gap growth and nominal income growth targeting; and inflation and output-gap contracts. Notably, since the timeless-optimal equilibrium is time-consistent, so is any delegation scheme that implements it.

Keywords: inflation, output gap growth and nominal income growth targeting., discretion and commitment, inertia, optimal delegation, stabilization bias, time inconsistency, timeless-optimal policy

JEL Classification: C61, C73, E31, E52, E61

Suggested Citation

Bilbiie, Florin O., Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia (October 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7482, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1507479

Florin O. Bilbiie (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

12 place du Panthéon
Paris, 75005
France

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