Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation

Episteme, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 39-55, 2005

30 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2009

Date Written: July 14, 2005


The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic value of maintaining consistency does not always outweigh the epistemic value of making true judgments.

Keywords: epistemic value theory, epistemology, judgment aggregation, doctrinal paradox, probability, consistency

Suggested Citation

Fallis, Don, Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation (July 14, 2005). Episteme, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 39-55, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1508875

Don Fallis (Contact Author)

Northeastern University ( email )

360 Huntington Ave,
Boston, MA 02115
United States

HOME PAGE: http://philpeople.org/profiles/don-fallis

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