Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe

40 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2009 Last revised: 5 Jun 2023

See all articles by Daniel S. Hamermesh

Daniel S. Hamermesh

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Gerard A. Pfann

Maastricht University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

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Date Written: November 2009

Abstract

We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one's peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual's most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar's most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary.

Suggested Citation

Hamermesh, Daniel S. and Pfann, Gerard Antonie, Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe (November 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15527, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1510477

Daniel S. Hamermesh (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Gerard Antonie Pfann

Maastricht University ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Germany

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