Incentives and Invention in Universities

Posted: 24 Nov 2009

See all articles by Saul Lach

Saul Lach

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; CEPR

Mark A. Schankerman

London School of Economics and Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

Economic incentives affect the number and commercialvalue of inventions generated in universities. Controlling for factorssuch as university size and research funding, an analysis of panel datacollected between 1991 and 1999 for 102 universities in the United Statesreveals that universities which give higher royalty shares to academicscientists generate more income from licenses and innovations.The datasources included the Association of University Technology Managers AnnualLicensing Surveys for 1991-1999, and the National Research Council NationalSurvey of Graduate Faculty for 1993.Private universities enjoy largerincentive effects than do public schools; in fact, in private schools, theincentive effect is strong enough to produce a Laffer effect, in which raisingthe inventor's royalty share increases the license income retained by theuniversity.(SAA)

Keywords: Laffer effect, AUTM Annual Licensing Surveys, NRC National Survey of Graduate Faculty, Royalties, Incentives, Technology transfer, Private colleges, Academic research, Licensing strategies, Faculty, Colleges & universities, Inventions

Suggested Citation

Lach, Saul and Schankerman, Mark A., Incentives and Invention in Universities (2003). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1510592

Saul Lach (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

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Israel
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+972 2 581 6071 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://economics.huji.ac.il/facultye/saul/saul.html

CEPR

London
United Kingdom

Mark A. Schankerman

London School of Economics and Political Science ( email )

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London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 7518 (Phone)
+44 20 7831 1840 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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