Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

28 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2009

See all articles by Laszlo A. Koczy

Laszlo A. Koczy

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS); Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Date Written: November 23, 2009

Abstract

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.

Keywords: Partition Function, Externalities, Implementation, Recursive Core, Stationary Perfect Equilibrium, Time Consistent Equilibrium

JEL Classification: C71, C72

Suggested Citation

Koczy, Laszlo A., Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (November 23, 2009). FEEM Working Paper No. 83.2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1511584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1511584

Laszlo A. Koczy (Contact Author)

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS) ( email )

Budaörsi 45
Budapest, H-1112
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://www.mtakti.hu/en/kutatok/laszlo-a-koczy/276/

Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Magyar Tudósok krt. 2.
Budapest, 1117
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://qsms.mokk.bme.hu/index.php/koczy/

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