Regulation 1/2003 Revisited

37 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2009

See all articles by Firat Cengiz

Firat Cengiz

University of Liverpool, School of Law

Date Written: November 24, 2009

Abstract

This paper takes a retrospective look at the institutional elements of the Modernisation of Community competition law in the light of and in Response to the European Commission Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003. Although the general tone of the paper is positive regarding the initial experiences of policy enforcement after Modernisation, it claims that Modernisation is a continuous process which has both centripetal and centrifugal effects on the European competition law regime. Likewise, the paper argues that the entire institutional regime is surrounded by serious accountability and due process problems. The general message of the paper is that, as an unintentional effect of decentralisation, European competition policy has become prone to general systemic problems of multi-level governance. The greatest responsibility in giving due consideration to these problems and working out the solutions falls to the European Commission, the designer of the decentralised enforcement regime and the European Competition Network. Likewise, the epistemic community can no longer treat competition policy as “special” and they need to place competition policy within the broader debate on multi-level governance in Europe.

Keywords: Multi-level governance, competition policy, decentralisation, policy networks, Regulation 1/2003, Modernisation Regulation, European Competition Network

JEL Classification: K21, K23, K42

Suggested Citation

Cengiz, Firat, Regulation 1/2003 Revisited (November 24, 2009). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-042, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1512527 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1512527

Firat Cengiz (Contact Author)

University of Liverpool, School of Law ( email )

Brownlow Hill
Liverpool, L69 3BX
United Kingdom

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