Rational Choice V. Republican Moment Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73

Abstract

A conventional wisdom within environmental law scholarship states that rational actor theories of politics cannot explain the major federal environmental laws that were enacted in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The reason: large groups of self-interested citizens, each anticipating only modest gains from such laws, would not surmount collective action obstacles so as to prevail over small groups of industrial concerns, each facing substantial costs if stringent laws were passed. A common alternative theory posits that these laws were the product of a "republican moment" when government enacted laws based on moral or political principles.

This article reassesses that debate and concludes that rational choice explanations have been too easily dismissed. For citizens, the critical action is casting a vote for candidates committed to protecting the environment. The article analyzes ways in which citizens whose concern about the environment is self-interested could surmount collective action problems to provide the catalyst for environmental legislation through their ballot box power. Empirical evidence from the relevant time period suggests that conditions at that time were consistent with this explanation. Hence, the battle over explanations of our environmental laws remains unresolved. The best explanation is most likely one that acknowledges the role both of self-interest and of political principle.

JEL Classification: D70, D71