The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Posted: 1 Dec 2009

See all articles by Benjamin Chiao

Benjamin Chiao

PSB Paris School of Business; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

Josh Lerner

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jean Tirole

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have gained increasingly important roles in determining and maintaining technological standards over the last twenty years. The relationship between the characteristics of SSOs and the rules that they enforce to license and disclose intellectual property are examined. First, two theories from Lerner-Triole (2004) are tested: (1) there is a negative correlation between the concession level of technology sponsors and the extent of the orientation of an SSO to them, and (2) the sponsor-friendliness of an SSO is positively related to the quality of a standard. It is hypothesized that a higher licensing price is associated with more disclosure within equilibrium, and settings with limited numbers of SSOs allow them to have greater control over technology sponsors. A database of 60 groups was established in 2003. Data were gathered from websites of SSOs, records of standards bodies, and information from surveys and interviews. Statistical analysis of the data revealed that the findings were consistent with both the propositions in this investigation and in Lerner-Triole (2004). Disclosure requirements are negatively related to policies requiring royalty-free licensing, whereas a positive relationship is found with policies with more reasonable licensing terms. Also, the connection between concessions and user-friendliness is not valid when only small numbers of SSOs are present. (SRY)

Keywords: Experimental/primary research, Invention disclosures, Intellectual property, Patents, Production standards, License agreements, Licensing strategies

Suggested Citation

Chiao, Benjamin and Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean, The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis (2005). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1513805

Benjamin Chiao (Contact Author)

PSB Paris School of Business ( email )

59 rue Nationale
Paris, 75013
France

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics ( email )

55 Guanghuacun St,
Chengdu, Sichuan 610074
China

Josh Lerner

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6065 (Phone)
617-496-7357 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit

Cambridge, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jean Tirole

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )

Place Anatole France
21 Allees de Brienne
F-31042 Toulouse Cedex
France
+33 5 61 12 8642 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
649
PlumX Metrics