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Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States


Anthea Roberts


Australian National University (ANU)

January 12, 2010

American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, p. 179, 2010

Abstract:     
A key problem in the investment treaty field is that the balance of interpretive power between treaty parties and tribunals is askew. Treaties that create rights for non-state actors, like human rights and investment treaties, establish dual roles for states as treaty parties (with an interest in interpretation) and actual or potential respondents in investor-state disputes (with an interest in avoiding liability). By viewing states primarily as respondents rather than also as treaty parties, tribunals often overlook or undervalue the importance of subsequent agreements and practices to interpretation. This article seeks to recalibrate that balance by proposing a constructive dialogue between treaty parties and tribunals based, in part, on a revaluation of such evidence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: investment, investment treaties, interpretation, interpretive balance, balance of power, subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, VCLT, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Free Trade Commission, FTC, delegation, dialogue, agency, trustee, human rights, duality, dual roles, exit, voice


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Date posted: December 5, 2009 ; Last revised: August 23, 2013

Suggested Citation

Roberts, Anthea, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States (January 12, 2010). American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, p. 179, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1514410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1514410

Contact Information

Anthea Roberts (Contact Author)
Australian National University (ANU) ( email )
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

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