Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea

Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 233-309, 1987-1988

77 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2009 Last revised: 26 Aug 2011

Date Written: June 30, 1986

Abstract

In this ground-breaking article submitted for publication in mid-1986, Lucinda Vandervort creates a radically new and comprehensive theory of sexual consent as the unequivocal affirmative communication of voluntary agreement. She argues that consent is a social act of communication with normative effects. To consent is to waive a personal legal right to bodily integrity and relieve another person of a correlative legal duty. If the criminal law is to protect the individual’s right of sexual self-determination and physical autonomy, rather than simply to regulate the type and degree of force that may be used to obtain compliance from a victim, the point of reference must be the individual complainant, as a person who makes choices, not social norms or objective tests based on the ordinary person. To determine whether consent is voluntary, attention must be directed to the presence or absence of factors that had a coercive impact on the individual complainant, a specific person with a collection of social, cultural, and psychological experiences, needs, fears, values, and priorities. Individuals have the right to exercise self-determination in accordance with their own values and perceptions, not those of a mythical victim. Accordingly, Vandervort argues that the prosecution may show either refusal, the absence of affirmative voluntary agreement (including passivity or the absence of consent due to unconsciousness), or circumstances that invalidate any apparent consent. Any of these prove the absence of consent for the purposes of establishing the actus reus of sexual assault.

The definition of consent as the affirmative communication of voluntary agreement is also shown to have a variety of implications for the interpretation and application of the law of sexual assault and the handling of evidentiary issues at trial in sexual assault cases. Key among these is the pivotal significance of the legal definition of consent as a tool to bar availability of the defence of “mistaken belief in consent.” Vandervort argues that in many cases the defence of “mistaken belief in consent” is based on ignorance of the law of consent, mistake about the legal definition of consent, or a failure to appreciate the legal significance of facts that are well-known, and not on a mistaken belief in an erroneous set of facts. The broad proposition asserted here is that a statutory criminal law is enforceable only if all defences based directly or indirectly on belief in the validity of extra-legal norms that authorize infringement of rights protected by the criminal law are barred. This proposition and the characterization of some mistakes about consent as legal, not factual, are also shown to be useful to exclude rape-myths and stereotypical assumptions---the stuff of which “social” definitions of consent have long been constructed---from the decision-making process at trial.

Keywords: sexual assault, consent, mens rea, mistake of law, defence of belief in consent, self-determination, sexual autonomy, affirmative consent

JEL Classification: J79, J70, J71, J78, K10, K14, K19, K39, K42, K41

Suggested Citation

Vandervort, Lucinda, Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea (June 30, 1986). Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 233-309, 1987-1988. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1514924

Lucinda Vandervort (Contact Author)

University of Saskatchewan ( email )

Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A6
Canada
(306) 966-5889 (Phone)
(306) 966-5900 (Fax)

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