Substitution between Managers and Subordinates: Evidence from British Football

34 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2009

See all articles by Sue Bridgewater

Sue Bridgewater

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Lawrence M. Kahn

Cornell University - School of Industrial and Labor Relations; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Amanda H. Goodall

IZA Institute for the Study of Labor

Abstract

We use data on British football managers and teams over the 1994-2007 period to study substitution and complementarity between leaders and subordinates. We find for the Premier League (the highest level of competition) that, other things being equal, managers who themselves played at a higher level raise the productivity of less-skilled teams by more than that of highly skilled teams. This is consistent with the hypothesis that one function of a top manager is to communicate to subordinates the skills needed to succeed, since less skilled players have more to learn. We also find that managers with more accumulated professional managing experience raise the productivity of talented players by more than that of less-talented players. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a further function of successful managers in high-performance workplaces is to manage the egos of elite workers. Such a function is likely more important the more accomplished the workers are οΎ– as indicated, in our data, by teams with greater payrolls.

Keywords: productivity, leadership

JEL Classification: J24, M51

Suggested Citation

Bridgewater, Sue and Kahn, Lawrence M. and Goodall, Amanda H., Substitution between Managers and Subordinates: Evidence from British Football. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4589. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1515136

Sue Bridgewater (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Lawrence M. Kahn

Cornell University - School of Industrial and Labor Relations ( email )

265 Ives Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
United States
607-255-0510 (Phone)
607-255-4496 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Amanda H. Goodall

IZA Institute for the Study of Labor ( email )

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9
Bonn, 53113
Germany

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