Why Lawyers are Nice (or Nasty): A Game-Theoretical Argumentation Exercise

ACM, pp. 108-19, ICAIL, 2009

EUI Working Paper No. 2009/08

22 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2009

See all articles by Giovanni Sartor

Giovanni Sartor

European University Institute Law Department

Michel Rudnianki

CNAM-IIM

Antonino Rotolo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Regis Riveret

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Eunate Mayor

European University Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2009

Abstract

This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.

Keywords: law, game theory, evolution, argumentation, litigation

Suggested Citation

Sartor, Giovanni and Rudnianki, Michel and Rotolo, Antonino and Riveret, Regis and Mayor, Eunate, Why Lawyers are Nice (or Nasty): A Game-Theoretical Argumentation Exercise (June 1, 2009). ACM, pp. 108-19, ICAIL, 2009 ; EUI Working Paper No. 2009/08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1515188 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1515188

Giovanni Sartor (Contact Author)

European University Institute Law Department ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
ITALY

Michel Rudnianki

CNAM-IIM ( email )

Paris
France

Antonino Rotolo

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Regis Riveret

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Eunate Mayor

European University Institute ( email )

Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence), Tuscany 50014
Italy

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