A Note on the Regulation of Executive Compensation within the 2009 US (Bailout)
International Journal of Regulation and Governance, December 2009
8 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2009 Last revised: 21 Mar 2011
Date Written: March 1, 2009
Abstract
This paper discusses the design and analyzes the potential benefits and costs of executive pay package policy within the US 2009 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), commonly known "Bailout". It shows that the ultimate effect of the EESA on executive compensation is generally difficult to predict. Moreover, this paper differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.
Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, and executive pay package caps
JEL Classification: G1, G2, J3, K2, L5, M5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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