Download This PaperDeclining Prices in Sequential Auctions with Complete Revelation of Bids
8 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2009 Last revised: 2 Apr 2019
Date Written: March 26, 2010
Abstract
In a sequential-auction setting, the expected-winning price is shown to decline across two stages when all bids are revealed between the stages. The prices decline because bidders desire to hide their private valuation information. The hiding also leads to inecient allocations.
Keywords: Auctions, Sequential auctions, Declining Price anomaly
JEL Classification: D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kannan, Karthik Natarajan, Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions with Complete Revelation of Bids (March 26, 2010). Economics Letters, Vol. 108, 49-51 (2010), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1515962
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