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Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Korean Economic Review, 2011, 27, 5-32.

31 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2009 Last revised: 24 Sep 2012

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Date Written: September 9, 2009

Abstract

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, both strong and weak players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer within the group, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer within the group, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts.

Keywords: contest, between-group competition, within-group competition, asymmetry, coordination, free-riding, experiments

JEL Classification: C71, C72, C91, C92, D72, H41

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M., Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups (September 9, 2009). Korean Economic Review, 2011, 27, 5-32.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1516019 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516019

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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