Indirect Communication in Situations of Bribes and Threats
Revista Sociedad y Economía, Departamento de Economía y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia, No. 16, pp. 67-85, 2009
Posted: 7 Dec 2009 Last revised: 6 Jan 2010
Date Written: November 30, 2009
The aim of this paper is to explain the relevance of the theory of indirect communication strategy and negotiating conflict. Based on Thomas Schelling illustrates indirect communication cases: bribery and threats. It shows that both bribery and threats are rational preference mechanisms, whose functions can be expressed in non-linear diagrams. This analysis also contributes to the theory of strategic games very different from zero. Indirect communication is a fundamental basis for strategic action in various forms of conflict, from war to irregular traffic jams caused by vehicular traffic. Our particular interest in the bribery and the threat is related to common cases in the colombian conflict.
Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.
Keywords: Indirect Communication, Speech Acts, Threats, bribery
JEL Classification: D74, D8, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation