Indirect Communication in Situations of Bribes and Threats

Revista Sociedad y Economía, Departamento de Economía y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia, No. 16, pp. 67-85, 2009

Posted: 7 Dec 2009 Last revised: 6 Jan 2010

See all articles by Fernando Estrada

Fernando Estrada

Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales

Date Written: November 30, 2009

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explain the relevance of the theory of indirect communication strategy and negotiating conflict. Based on Thomas Schelling illustrates indirect communication cases: bribery and threats. It shows that both bribery and threats are rational preference mechanisms, whose functions can be expressed in non-linear diagrams. This analysis also contributes to the theory of strategic games very different from zero. Indirect communication is a fundamental basis for strategic action in various forms of conflict, from war to irregular traffic jams caused by vehicular traffic. Our particular interest in the bribery and the threat is related to common cases in the colombian conflict.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Keywords: Indirect Communication, Speech Acts, Threats, bribery

JEL Classification: D74, D8, D82

Suggested Citation

Estrada, Fernando, Indirect Communication in Situations of Bribes and Threats (November 30, 2009). Revista Sociedad y Economía, Departamento de Economía y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia, No. 16, pp. 67-85, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1516060

Fernando Estrada (Contact Author)

Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales ( email )

Calle 12 # 0 - 85 Este, Barrio La Candelaria
Bogota, DC Cundinamarca 1267
Colombia
05-71 - 3419900 - ext. 1202 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ideas.repec.org/f/pga454.html

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
939
PlumX Metrics