Strategic Evolution of Armed Conflict in Colombia
Revista Analisis Politico, pp. 156-181, December 2009
26 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2009 Last revised: 7 Jan 2010
Date Written: November 30, 2009
This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling/Nozick/Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author’s scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging bands and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author proposes a heuristic research support from the theory of strategy Schelling, agencies and the protection of Nozick, Gambetta recent contributions on the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.
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Keywords: Colombia, armed conflict, drug trafficking, organized crime, paramilitary counterinsurgency war, Game Theory and inconsistent information
JEL Classification: D74, D82, N46
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation