Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role of Debt

52 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2009  

Aiyesha Dey

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Xue Wang

Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business

Valeri V. Nikolaev

University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Date Written: November 1, 2009

Abstract

We examine how firms’ capital structure choices vary with the presence of dual-class ownership and the degree of disproportional control associated with it. We document that, compared to a propensity-matched sample of single-class firms, dual-class firms have higher leverage, greater propensity to issue private debt, more long-term debt, and greater reliance on financial covenants. Within our dual-class sample, the use of debt financing increases with the degree of disproportional control via voting rights or board election rights. This evidence is consistent with controlling insiders bonding against the agency problems associated with dual-class ownership through their capital structure choices. Also consistent with this view, we document that leverage attenuates (and ultimately reverses) the adverse effect of dual-class status on Tobin’s q and cost of equity capital, and is associated with increased institutional investment in dual-class firms. Taken together, our evidence suggests that debt plays a governance role and disciplines insiders in dual-class firms.

Keywords: corporate governance, dual-class ownership, disproportional control, debt financing, capital structure, Tobin’s q

JEL Classification: G30, G38

Suggested Citation

Dey, Aiyesha and Wang, Xue and Nikolaev , Valeri V., Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role of Debt (November 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1516351 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516351

Aiyesha Dey

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
6126268626 (Phone)

Xue Wang

Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
614-688-1330 (Phone)
614-292-2118 (Fax)

Valeri V. Nikolaev (Contact Author)

University of Chicago Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/valeri.nikolaev/index.html

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