Too Big to Fail: The Role for Antitrust and Bankruptcy Law in Financial Regulation Reform, Part II

37 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2010  

Chris Sagers

Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

Chris Sagers presented the following written testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy on November 17, 2009. His testimony concerns the antitrust consequences and the risks to competition posed by the proposed financial regulatory reform package current pending in the House of Representatives - specifically, the package proposed by the Treasury and Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank. The testimony concludes that the package introduces certain serious antitrust risks, both by triggering the "implied repeal" doctrine, and by giving the FDIC certain powers to cause the "resolution" of failing financial holding companies with very little antitrust constraint on its disposition of the FHCs' assets. More generally, it concludes that there is a distressing lack of concern throughout the legislation with antitrust or competition, and a failure to see competition as any part of any solution to anything.

Note: Submitted before the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, November 17, 2009.

Keywords: financial regulation, financial regulatory reform, Treasury financial regulatory reform bill, Frank financial regulatory reform bill, implied repeal, credit suisse, trinko, antitrust and financial sector, antitrust

Suggested Citation

Sagers, Chris, Too Big to Fail: The Role for Antitrust and Bankruptcy Law in Financial Regulation Reform, Part II (December 1, 2009). Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper No. 09-181. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1516381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516381

Chris Sagers (Contact Author)

Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University ( email )

2121 Euclid Avenue, LB 138
Cleveland, OH 44115-2214
United States

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