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Economic Analysis and Evaluation of 'Fair Prices' - Can Antitrust and International Taxation Learn from Each Other?


Alessandro Turina


Bocconi University

Nicolo Zingales


University of Sussex Law School; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT); Stanford University - Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society

December 1, 2009

CLPE Research Paper No. 51/2009

Abstract:     
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the different kinds of concerns related to the notion of “unfair prices” in tax and competition policy, respectively. The focus is on the rules governing transfer pricing within the setting of international tax policy, and on those governing the treatment of excessive as well as predatory pricing, according to competition policy.

After a brief methodological background, the paper introduces the various notions of transfer, excessive and predatory pricing stressing the differences and similarities in the respective regulations. It does so distinguishing the rules established by the United States and the OECD, in the area of transfer pricing, and the different approach taken by the US and the EU, with respect to competition policy.

Finally, the paper advances some tentative reflections on the possible scope for convergence between the three aforementioned areas of enquiry, elaborating some proposals from a policy making perspective.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Transfer Pricing, Predatory Pricing, Excessive Pricing, Economic Analysis of Law, Interdisciplinary Approach, Legal Certainty

JEL Classification: K21, K34


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Date posted: December 9, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Turina, Alessandro and Zingales, Nicolo, Economic Analysis and Evaluation of 'Fair Prices' - Can Antitrust and International Taxation Learn from Each Other? (December 1, 2009). CLPE Research Paper No. 51/2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1516486 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516486

Contact Information

Alessandro Turina (Contact Author)
Bocconi University ( email )
Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy
Nicolo Zingales
University of Sussex Law School ( email )
Falmer
Brighton BN1 9QN
United Kingdom
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT) ( email )
P.O.Box 90153
Prof. Cobbenhagenlaan 221
Tilburg, 5037
Netherlands
Stanford University - Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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