Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers

28 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 1997

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1996

Abstract

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterized, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.

JEL Classification: H29

Suggested Citation

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers (January 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=15167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.15167

Luigi Alberto Franzoni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna ( email )

P.zza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40124
Italy
0512098488 (Phone)
+39-051-221968 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/luigi.franzoni/en

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