Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers
28 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 1997
There are 2 versions of this paper
Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers
Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers
Date Written: January 1996
Abstract
This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterized, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.
JEL Classification: H29
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Certification Disclosure and Informational Efficiency: A Case for Ordered Ranking of Levels
-
That's News to Me! Information Revelation in Professional Certification Markets
By John A. List, Andrew Kato, ...
-
That's News to Me! Information Revelation in Professional Certification Markets
By Ginger Zhe Jin, Andrew Kato, ...
-
Free-Entry Equilibrium in a Market for Certifiers
By Hans K. Hvide and Aviad Heifetz
-
Who Should Pay for Certification?
By Konrad O. Stahl and Roland Strausz
-
Who Should Pay for Certification?
By Konrad O. Stahl and Roland Strausz
-
Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification
-
The Impact of Online Information on the Value of Quality Signals in Traditional Markets
By Vandana Ramachandran, Siva Viswanathan, ...