Understanding Collaborative Governance from the Structural Choice - Politics, IAD, and Transaction Cost Perspectives

31 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2009 Last revised: 6 Apr 2010

See all articles by Shui Yan Tang

Shui Yan Tang

University of Southern California

Daniel A. Mazmanian

University of Southern California - Sol Price School of Public Policy

Date Written: March 1, 2010

Abstract

Defined as the process of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, and monitoring cross-sectoral organizational arrangements to address public policy problems, collaborative governance has emerged as an institutional form valued by both professional and research audiences across a growing range of policy arenas. Practice has preceded theory, however, and we know far more about particulars than how to explain from broader theoretical perspectives the emergence and viability of collaborative governance. This paper explores how three well established and related theoretical perspectives — structural choice politics, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, and transaction cost analysis — can be used to bring theoretical clarity to the phenomenon of collaborative governance. In addition to suggesting research propositions from the three perspectives, the paper also proposes directions for future research.

Keywords: collaboration, transaction costs, institutions, structural politics, governance

Suggested Citation

Tang, Shui Yan and Mazmanian, Daniel, Understanding Collaborative Governance from the Structural Choice - Politics, IAD, and Transaction Cost Perspectives (March 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1516851 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516851

Shui Yan Tang (Contact Author)

University of Southern California ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States
2137400379 (Phone)

Daniel Mazmanian

University of Southern California - Sol Price School of Public Policy ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States

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