Accounting and the Welfare-State: The Missing Link

30 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2009

See all articles by Tim-Frederik Oehr

Tim-Frederik Oehr

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics; University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control

Date Written: July 1, 2009

Abstract

In recent years accounting regulation has internationalized with the extensive use and adoption of IFRS by nation-states which points at least at a formal convergence of accounting systems. But still major differences between national accounting systems persist. In this paper it is argued that the accounting system of countries is influenced by the type of the welfare-state. This allows us to see accounting in a broader social perspective. The societal attitudes influencing the ac-counting system are captured by using the Esping-Andersen classification of welfare states and show that the aims of accounting are reflecting the regime of the welfare-state. To show that there is a connection between the typology of welfare-states and the degree of balancing interests between corporate constituencies, we compare Germany as an example for a conservative welfare-state and the UK as an example for a liberal welfare-state. According to this, it can be shown that the type of welfare state exerts an influence to the system of accounting and therefore can be seen as explanatory variable for persisting differences of accounting systems.

Keywords: Comparative Accounting Research, Institutionalism, Critical Perspective

JEL Classification: M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Oehr, Tim-Frederik and Zimmermann, Jochen, Accounting and the Welfare-State: The Missing Link (July 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1517054 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1517054

Tim-Frederik Oehr (Contact Author)

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Bremen, D-28359
Germany
+49 421 218 7553 (Phone)
+49 421 218 2869 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.controlling.uni-bremen.de

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Hochschulring 4
Germany
+49 421 218 9121 (Phone)

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control ( email )

Universitaetsallee GW I
Bremen, D-28334
Germany
+49 421 218-9119 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.controlling.uni-bremen.de

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
114
Abstract Views
1,432
rank
254,092
PlumX Metrics