The Constraining Power of International Treaties

American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, 623-631, November 2005

9 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2009

See all articles by Beth A. Simmons

Beth A. Simmons

University of Pennsylvania

Daniel J. Hopkins

University of Pennsylvania

Date Written: November 1, 2005

Abstract

We acknowledge the contribution of von Stein (2005) in calling attention to the very real problem of selection bias in estimating treaty effects. Nonetheless, we dispute both von Stein’s theoretical and empirical conclusions. Theoretically, we contend that treaties can both screen and constrain simultaneously, meaning that findings of screening do nothing to undermine the claim that treaties constrain state behavior as well. Empirically, we question von Stein’s estimator on several grounds, including its strong distributional assumptions and its statistical inconsistency. We then illustrate that selection bias does not account for much of the difference between Simmons’ (2000) and von Stein’s (2005) estimated treaty effects, and instead reframe the problem as one of model dependency. Using a preprocessing matching step to reduce that dependency, we then illustrate treaty effects that are both substantively and statistically significant - and that are quite close in magnitude to those reported by Simmons (2000).

Keywords: international treaties

Suggested Citation

Simmons, Beth A. and Hopkins, Daniel J., The Constraining Power of International Treaties (November 1, 2005). American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, 623-631, November 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1518412

Beth A. Simmons (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

3501Sansom
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
7817990076 (Phone)

Daniel J. Hopkins

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Stiteler Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.danhopkins.org

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