Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing Countries?

INTERNATIONAL LAW, ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Julio Faundez and Celine Tan, eds., E. Elgar, 2010

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-52

35 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2009 Last revised: 12 Jul 2014

Kevin E. Davis

New York University School of Law

Date Written: December 8, 2009

Abstract

What role do foreign institutions play in combating political corruption in developing countries? This chapter begins by describing the recently developed transnational anti-corruption regime, which encompasses legal instruments ranging from the dedicated multilateral agreements sponsored by the OECD and the United Nations, to the anti-corruption policies of international financial institutions, to components of the international antimony laundering regime, international norms governing government procurement, and private law norms concerning enforcement of corruptly procured contracts. It also surveys the evidence concerning a variety of claims about the potential advantages and disadvantages of having foreign institutions play a role in preventing, sanctioning, or providing redress for corruption on the part of local public officials. One of the main conclusions is that more attention ought to be paid to whether foreign institutions displace and undermine, or alternatively complement and enhance, local anti-corruption institutions. The analysis not only sheds light on the transnational anti-corruption regime, but also has implications for other efforts to rely on foreign legal institutions to address the problems of developing countries.

Suggested Citation

Davis, Kevin E., Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing Countries? (December 8, 2009). INTERNATIONAL LAW, ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Julio Faundez and Celine Tan, eds., E. Elgar, 2010; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-52. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1520553

Kevin E. Davis (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Vanderbilt Hall, Room 335
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-992-8843 (Phone)

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